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Abstract
This paper analyses how institutions aimed at coordinating economic interactions may emerge.
Starting from a hypothetical state of nature, agents can delegate the task of enforcing cooperation
to one of them in exchange for a proper compensation. Both individual and collective commitment
problems stand in the way of institution formation. These problems imply first that a potentially
efficient institution may fail to emerge and also that if it emerges, it may do so inefficiently. We
show that big and untrustworthy societies are more likely to support institutions whereas their
emergence is more difficult in small and trusting societies, but if institutions do emerge, they tend
to be more inefficient in the former type of societies. Finally, we show that the threat of secession
by a subset of agents may alleviate the latter problem.
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As for philosophical history, it involved accounting for the
development of beliefs, practices, theories, and institutions on the
basis of natural causes or principles, when actual records and re-
ports of witnesses were lacking.
Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (1995).
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and overview
To date the literature on the economic analysis of social and political insti-
tutions has focused mainly on their role as protectors of property rights.1 A
more neglected role of institutions is to correct the coordination failures or
commitment problems that sometimes plague the most basic type of economic
interactions. Contributions along this line of enquiry have modeled institu-
tions as a set of self-enforcing constraints on behavior, usually relating them
to narrative descriptions derived from historical sources.2
These works describe institutional arrangements already in place, but
very little has been said on the factors that lead to the emergence of these
institutions. The aim of this paper is to analyze the process of creation of
a specialized institution responsible for enforcing e¢ cient rules for social in-
teractions. We do this in the context of individualist societies, as Dixit
(2003a) puts it, in which interactions mostly involve strangers and coopera-
tion cannot rely on the type of multilateral mechanisms, mostly norms and
communication, that prevail in more collectivist societies such as families,
or small and homogenous ethnic or religious groups. Our model of institution
formation especially applies to the emergence of institutional intermediaries
in trade exchanges in early societies and intra-industry interactions between
rms. Examples of the former include the introduction of commercial wit-
nesses in the development of formal trade between tribes in Africa, aboriginal
Australia or pre-Columbian Nicaragua (Attali, 2003).3 Examples of the latter
include the emergence of the private legal framework that rules the US cotton
industry (Bernstein, 2001) or the private arrangements in the diamond indus-
try (Bernstein, 1992, Richman, 2006), the creation of formal credit reference
agencies in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe (Fafchamps, 2004), and of dispute
resolution mechanisms in Asia (MacMillan and Woodru¤, 1999, 2000).
1See Bardhan (2005).
2See Greif (1997) for a review.
3See also Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990), Dixit (2003a).
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The point of departure of our model is an economy in the state of
nature in which the value of each individuals endowment is enhanced through
bilateral interactions. Interactions take the form of a simple prisonersdilemma
game. Mutual cooperation would benet both parties but being opportunistic
is a dominant strategy and in equilibrium low payo¤s are realized. In this
context, the institution is a body capable of enforcing the Pareto e¢ cient
outcome in any bilateral interaction. For the sake of tractability, and because
we want to focus on the potential emergence of this body, we choose not to
model explicitly its internal functioning.
The process of emergence of such institution is modelled through a dy-
namic, non-repeated game that agents play in this hypothetical state of nature.
Depending on the existing incentives, playersactions will eventually lead to
the establishment of such formal coordinating mechanism as an equilibrium
of the game. For the formal institution to arise, agents need to delegate to
one of them the task of running it. The institution is costly to set up. The
delegate must relinquish her ability to interact with other agents, and must
be properly compensated in exchange. If the institution arises, agents have
to decide whether to become formal and abide by its norms of interaction or
not. Whenever two formal agents meet, the institution can guarantee that the
e¢ cient outcome will result. However, in order to enjoy this benet, agents
must pay a fee that constitutes the source of revenue for the institution.
We explore several procedures of institution formation and characterize
under which circumstances they will be successful. We make special emphasis
on the impact of these di¤erent processes on e¢ ciency and welfare.
Individualsmotivation to participate in the process of institution for-
mation are the rents associated with the institutional task. This, together
with the fact that they do not fully internalize the social benet generated by
the institution, implies that a decentralized process of institution formation is
plagued by two commitment problems. The rst one is simply the individual
commitment problem that arises when the revenue that can be raised by the
agent chosen to act run the institution is insu¢ cient, and she prefers to renege
ex post, leading society to fall back into informality. The second one, which
we label collective commitmentproblem, is linked to the fact that agents
may not be able to write binding agreements on the fee that will be charged
by the institution once it is created.
Both limitations on commitment have implications for e¢ ciency. The
rst one implies that an institution may not arise due to the lack of indi-
vidual incentives and despite being potentially welfare enhancing. This is in
particular the case when the extent of the coordination problem is limited.
The intuition is that when the level of trust in the state of nature is relatively
2
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high, the outside option in which no institution emerges is more attractive and
agentswillingness to pay in order to create the institution is lower. On the
other hand, the lack of collective commitment implies that even if an institu-
tion emerges, it may do so at a sub-optimal level of e¢ ciency because the fee
nally charged may be too high from a social point of view. This happens for
low levels of trust in the state of nature, because in that case the institution
is able to set a high fee compared to the rst-best level.
We show that small societies with high levels of trust are less likely to
support the emergence of institutions than big ones with low levels of trust,
but if institutions do emerge, they are more likely to be ine¢ cient in the latter
type of societies.
Exogenously imposed commitment along each one of the two dimen-
sions alone would reduce the scope for ine¢ ciencies, but the rst-best institu-
tion emerges only when both problems can be solved simultaneously. We then
examine several devices that may help to solve these commitment problems
endogenously. The rst one is agentsuse of a particular type of strategies that
enable them to constrain the ability of the institution to extract too much re-
sources. The second potential improvement is the threat of secession by a
subset of agents. To deter secession, the institution must charge a fee that
cannot be improved upon by any coalition. However, this e¤ect only operates
for a limited parameter space; a big population size and high levels of trust
in the state of nature make it very attractive to become a central agent and
therefore create too strong incentives to secede.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Next, we review the related
literature and spell out our specic contribution in that context. Section 2
presents the model and its basic elements. In Section 3 we characterize the
equilibrium level of formality, once the institution has arisen, and the rst
best fee from the viewpoint of a social planner. Section 4 explores di¤erent
procedures of institution formation characterized by varying degrees of com-
mitment. In Section 5 we explore two ways to endogenize commitment. Section
6 discusses the results and concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 Literature review
Previous works on the role of institutions as coordination devices have mainly
explored the functioning of specic institutional arrangements, in the light
of both empirical accounts and game-theoretical modelling.4 In the words
4See Greif (1997) for a survey of the economic history literature that relies on micro-
economic theory to study institutions.
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of Dixit (2004), in this literature a distinction can be drawn depending on
how the enforcement of coordination or cooperation is attained: On the one
hand, models of self-governance, understood as equilibria sustained by some
type of relation-based multilateral mechanism (punishment, communication),
and on the other hand models of formal rule-based institutional arrangements,
whereby some qualied agent(s) takes on the role of solving coordination prob-
lems among the rest of the population. The former is exemplied by Greifs
(1993) study of the coalition supporting the interactions of Maghribi traders
with their distant agents in the 11th century, and modelled for example in Kan-
dori (1992) and Ellison (1994), while case studies of the latter, characterized
by bilateral enforcement of interactions, are found in Milgrom et al. (1990),
Bernstein (2001), and Richman (2006) among others. Relation-based multi-
lateral enforcement generally prevails in relatively homogenous groups, while
bilateral rule-based enforcement mechanisms are more likely in the context of
relatively anonymous interactions in large groups.5
Our analysis focuses on formal rule-based institutions. Apart from
the ones mentioned above, example include the case of organized crime and
the role of Peppe in ensuring that cattle breeders and butchers do not cheat
each other when trading (Gambetta, 1993) or the merchant courts at the
Champagne fairs of the 12th and 13th centuries (Milgrom et al., 1990).6 Such
institutions are potentially very diverse and can rely not only on coercion, as
in the Hobbesian approach of Bates, Greif and Singh (2002), but also on
more subtle forms of persuasion, e.g., as a Humeanpolitical entrepreneur or
government, able to persuade others to take a particular action or alter their
beliefs about this actions consequences (see Taylor, 1982, and Basu, 2000).
How do these institutions emerge? The literature on the origins of
institutions distinguishes two main views. On the one hand is the e¢ cient
institutionsview, whereby optimal institutions emerge as they are in the in-
terest of the whole community. Such e¢ cient institutions, addressing di¤erent
underlying failures or problems, are found for example in Grossman (2002),
Olsons (2000) roving versus stationary bandits and Baker, Bulte and Weisdorf
(2010) and Baker (2003). These papers address situations in which some agent
is endowed with power in order to protect the rest of the community against
an outside threat. Bates et al. (2002) provide numerous historical examples
to support their theoretical account of why agents may seek to attribute the
monopoly of violence to a delegate, a canonical State, in charge of ensuring
5Greif (1994). Dixit (2003b) and Li (2003) provide theoretical foundations.
6See also Greif (1997) on Genoese traders, and Konrad and Leininger (2007) on clan
leaders in inter-group conict.
4
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 1 (Contributions), Art. 84
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.19.188
Download Date | 6/7/13 5:13 PM
peace and enabling higher levels of production. More generally, accounts of
the State as an entity solving coordination problems also t here.7 On the
other hand, the social conict perspectiveholds that potentially ine¢ cient
institutions emerge and evolve as the result of a struggle between di¤erent
interest groups, as modelled for example in Acemoglu and Robinson (2005).8
Our contribution falls in the e¢ cient institutions category of mod-
els. However, it displays a number of di¤erences with the existing literature.
First of all, while in most papers mentioned above, the ine¢ ciency rooted in
the decentralized setting is the exposure to violence or robbery, leading to the
emergence of an institution that taxes people in exchange for protection, we
focus on a situation in which the fundamental ine¢ ciency is the lack of in-
centives to cooperate. In that sense, our paper formalizes some of the claims
made informally by Greif (2005) who, based on historical examples, concludes
that societies with strong informal institutions will have a low demand for
formal enforcement methods. The author also shows how rulers ability to
abuse rights hinder the creation of institutions. In our case, the rulers abil-
ity to extract the whole surplus has an impact on e¢ ciency rather than on
emergence, leading to a situation in which institutions may still emerge in low
trust societies but they are more likely to be ine¢ cient. Furthermore, this
extracting ability is the key reason why some agent will be willing to perform
the institutional task, although it may not always be su¢ cient.
Second, within that class of models, we analyze departure from the
rst best due to problems of commitment. In that sense, we are able to
characterize not only conditions under which an institution emerges to address
a fundamental ine¢ ciency, but also how limited commitment, both on the
side of the chosen leader and of the general population, leads to second-best
outcomes. This means that institutions may be too extractive, but also that
they may not be immune to the risk of secession and could therefore end
up beneting only subgroups of the population. Indeed, in our model the
institution initially emerges from the set of agents that would like to run it,
but we later consider the possibility that groups may secede from society in
order to create their own institution if they nd that the original one was too
extractive. In that sense, our conclusions can for example be related to the
7See Taylor (1982) and Basu (2000). This is also an important topic in social anthro-
pology. For example, Ensminger (1992) describes the century-long process through which
changes in the environment triggered the Orma tribe in Kenya to move from a rule by a
council of elders to the recognition of the authority of the modern Kenyan nation-state.
8Some contributions have analyzed how informal or personalized relationship-based in-
stitutions may coexist with more formal, rule-based anonymous mechanisms, and how the
transition from one to the other may occur (e.g., Kranton, 1996, and Dixit, 2004).
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account in Fafchamps (2004), who shows that although in Zimbabwe, contrary
to Ghana and Kenya, the coordination problem between rms mentioned above
had apparently been solved through the creation of a formal credit reference
agency, the outcome was not as e¢ cient as expected. Indeed, the institutional
mechanism in fact only beneted a limited number of rms, dened along
ethnic boundaries, and was de facto excluding some of the players who stood
to benet from it.
Third, our methodological perspective is new in the sense that, in con-
trast to the existing literature, our model explicitly focuses on the emergence
process, by endogenizing the rise of a ruler from a population of identical indi-
viduals, in contrast with other works in the literature that exogenously impose
its existence (Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2004) and look at how its pres-
ence shapes economic outcomes, or compare the scenarios with and without
ruler (Grossman, 2002; Moselle and Polak, 2001; Baker, 2010) to characterize
parameters thresholds associated with potential emergence.
Finally, we also contribute to the discussion on the link between social
capital and institutions (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005, and Ahlerup et al.,
2009), by providing micro-foundations for the observed negative correlation
between trust and the likelihood of formal institution emergence.
2 The model
Consider an economy populated by N + 1 agents, each having an initial en-
dowment ! (representing a combination of skills, time and goods). Agents
interactions in this economy are described by the basic game G in Figure 1.
0,0z,-zNC
-z,zx,xC
NCC
Player j
Player i
Figure 1: Basic game G.
Agents are anonymous to each other. They are randomly and bilaterally
matched to play G. Payo¤s in the matrix represent the return per unit of
6
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endowment invested in the interaction. We assume that z > x > 0: The
strategy C stands for a cooperative behavior that can create added value,
and NC stands for an opportunistic behavior that allows the agent to take
advantage of a cooperating partner but yields zero returns otherwise.
The game G admits a unique Nash equilibrium, (NC;NC); that is
Pareto inferior to (C;C). As is common in the literature, we have chosen
this game as the simplest way to illustrate the type of coordination problems
that occur in many social situations, but many other games could capture the
same trade-o¤s we study here, like for instance a coordination game with two
equilibria, one Pareto-superior to the other.
The scenario in which individuals are randomly and bilaterally matched
and play G without any interference is assumed to be the status-quo of the
economy. In order to solve the problem of opportunism, agents can set up an
institution with the power to enforce cooperation and ensure that the e¢ cient
outcome (C;C) results from any interaction between agents under its oversight.
Given that we are mainly interested in studying when such institutions can
arise, and that in doing so we want to keep the analysis tractable, in what
follows we just consider a reduced form of the actual process the institution
employs to enforce cooperation.
This institution arises when agents delegate to one of them, who we will
call the center, the task of running it. The central agent relinquishes her ability
to interact with other agents, so she must be compensated in exchange. At
this point, we deliberatively remain vague about how this delegation process
is carried through since the main body of the paper (Section 4 below) amounts
to discussing several procedures of institution formation.
If the institution arises, agents have to decide whether to abide by it,
that is, to become formal, or not to do so and remain informal. However, in
order to become formal and interact under the institutional umbrella, they
each have to pay a xed fee a  !, that can be understood as an entry fee or
a lump-sum tax that rewards the center for her activity. Below we will also
discuss at length how the level of the fee a is xed.
We will admit a richer description of the payo¤ x in G and assume
that it depends on the e¢ ciency of the institutional mechanism that in turn
is a function of the level of agents individual contribution a.9 Hence, the
per-person unit return from an interaction between two formal agents is
9Making x also dependent on N would introduce scale e¤ects. Alternatively, x could
also be a function of the proportion of agents KN contributing to it. However, it is unclear
how this would a¤ect x. Indeed, a higher proportion could have a positive e¤ect because of
network externalities for example, but congestion could also lead to a negative e¤ect (see
Kranton, 1996).
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vF = x (a) ; (1)
where the superscript F denotes Formal and x() satises xa > 0;
xaa < 0; and the standard Inada condition, lima!0 xa (a) = 1. We thus
assume that the institution becomes more e¢ cient when endowed with more
resources, as it is able to monitor better its membersbehavior or to invest
more in physical or relational supporting infrastructure, as for example in the
case of diamond clubs described in Richman (2006). If x did not depend on a,
so for instance it took two values depending on whether the institution arises
or not, all our results on emergence would hold, but we would be unable to
obtain di¤erent levels of e¢ ciency.
When at least one of the two interacting agents is informal, the insti-
tution has no power to enforce the e¢ cient outcome and the game G is played
without any further interference. Informal agents thus avoid paying the fee
but their interactions yield lower returns. More formally, the per-person ex-
pected unit return when G is played between a formal and an informal agent
or between two informal agents is
vI = y; (2)
where the superscript I denotes Informal. This payo¤ can be inter-
preted as the upper bound on what can be achieved between agents who do
not use the formal institutional umbrella. For example, when there exist un-
foreseen uctuations in the environment, these uctuations may create temp-
tationsto act non-cooperatively.10 In the absence of an external institution
capable of solving this problem, such temptations are optimally addressed by
settling for lower cooperation payo¤s. Alternatively, this payo¤ can be in-
terpreted as the payo¤ of self-enforcing agreements under nitely repeated
interactions when players believe that a fraction of agents are altruists or use
tit-for-tat strategies.11
To keep the model tractable, y is assumed to be an initial condition of
our economy. More specically, we dene   y
x(a)
< 1, as a measure of the
level of cooperation attainable in a world without institution relative to the
situation where the institution does arise. Under our rst interpretation, this is
equivalent to assume that the informal payo¤ y is a constant proportion of the
10In Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) these uctuations emerge from changes in demand
that create incentives to renege on collusive agreements. Similarly, Bagwell and Staiger
(1990) study international trade when trade swings create incentives for protectionism.
11See Kreps et al. (1982).
one obtained under the institution for any given fee (x(a)). Under the second
interpretation, the measure  can be related to the share of the population
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believed to have altruistic preferences. Kreps et al. (1982) show that the extent
of cooperation is non-decreasing in this share. This degree of cooperation is
also often referred to as a measure of social capital.12 Again, our assumption
in this case would be that the degree of cooperation does not change with the
fee (i.e., that y is a constant fraction of x(a)). A third interpretation of the
parameter  , in line with the literature on informality, is the level of free-riding
that informal interactions can make on formal institutions.13 In what follows,
we will refer to  as the level of trust or cooperation in the society under the
state of nature.
Finally, we assume that x(0) > 1

to ensure that participating in a com-
pletely informal economy always dominates the autarchic situation in which
agents do not interact and simply consume their endowments.
Under risk neutrality and anonymous random matching,14 the expected
payo¤ of a formal agent when K  2 agents are formal can be written as
V F =
K   1
N   1 (!   a) v
F +
N  K
N   1 (!   a) v
I
=
K   1
N   1 (!   a)x (a) +
N  K
N   1 (!   a) x (a) : (3)
We assume that an institution becomes active if at least two agents
are formal, so the probability of formal exchanges is strictly positive. On the
other hand, the payo¤ for an informal agent is just.
V I = !vI = !y = !x (a) ;
since he avoids paying the formality fee. Note that when no more than
one agent becomes formal, vFa = v
I
a = x (0) for any a that the central agent
might have set.
Finally, the central agent, who gives up interacting with the rest of
agents, receives the fees paid by all formal agents. Her payo¤ is thus given by
V C = K(a  c);
where c is the xed enforcement cost per formal agent, linked for ex-
ample to the need to record information on its behavior, maintain proper in-
frastructure, etc. As will come clear below, an alternative formulation with a
12Routledge and von Amsberg (2003), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004).
13See for example Marcouiller and Young (1995), Choi and Thum (2002), Azuma and
Grossman (2002) and Straub (2005).
14We discuss alternative matching technologies in the nal section of the paper.
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cost proportional to the number of formal transactions would not qualitatively
change results.
Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the game described above.
t=1
A delegation
process occurs
that determines
who will run the
institution.
t=2
If the institution has
emerged, the fee a
to be paid by formal
agents is set. If not,
the status quo
remains (informal
exchanges)
t=3
Agents decide
whether to
become formal
(pay the fee) or
not.
t=4
Agents are
randomly
matched and
play G. Payoffs
are realized.
time
Figure 2: Timing of the game.
We have thus constructed a dynamic, non-repeated game of complete
information in four stages. In the rst stage, agents set up the institution (the
game stops there if they do not succeed in doing so). Then, the institutional
fee a is set. In the third stage, agents decide whether to become formal or not.
In the last stage, they are paired with another interacting agent in society and
play G, eventually resorting to the institution set up earlier.
3 The equilibrium level of formality
3.1 Existence and stability
Given this basic framework, the rst question that arises concerns the existence
and stability of di¤erent congurations. Assume that K agents are formal,
N  K are informal, and that, without loss of generality, the N + 1th agent is
devoted to institutional work. Given a fee a, this division of agents between
formality and informality can be supported in equilibrium if and only if no
agent is willing to deviate and change her status.
A formal agents best response is not to deviate and become informal
as long as V FK;a  V IK 1;a. After some transformations, this can be written:
a  !

1  (N   1) 
K   1 + (N  K)

 a(K):
10
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Similarly, an informal agent will not choose formality as long as V IK;a 
V FK+1;a, which yields:
a  !

1  (N   1) 
K + (N  K   1)

= a(K + 1):
Note rst that 0 < a(K) < ! for all K > 1 and that given our assump-
tion above stating that the institution remains inactive if K = 1, a(1) = 0:
The equilibrium level of formality will depend upon the properties of
a(). The next Proposition characterizes the conditions under which there
exists a level of the institutional fee a that can support a certain amount of
formal agents in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The function a() is strictly increasing in K. Hence, there are
only two equilibria, one with K = 0 and one with K = N .
In this model, only corner equilibria exist, i.e. full formality or full
informality15. When full formality prevails, a(N) = ! (1  ). We will as-
sume that c < ! (1  ) : Otherwise even the highest fee compatible with full
formality could not cover the running costs of the institution. The follow-
ing proposition characterizes a necessary condition for this outcome to be an
equilibrium:
Proposition 2 A necessary condition for informality (K = 0) to be an equi-
librium is a  0, whereas a necessary condition for full formality (K = N) to
be an equilibrium is a  a(N):
The proof follows from the arguments above. This Proposition shows
that a coordination problem arises when the institution emerges. Paying a fee
compatible with full formality may not compensate the cost of becoming formal
when everybody else is informal. Hence, both full formality and informality
can be sustained in equilibria for the same level of the fee. For the rest of
the paper, we will mainly focus on the equilibrium in which the institution
forms. We see it as more natural because at that point of the game agents
have decided to participate in the process, a central agent has been chosen and
the fee has already been announced. Still, we will leave a further discussion
on the informal equilibrium to Section 5.
15In Kranton (1996), a similar outcome arises, in which the entire population engages
either in market or in reciprocal exchange.
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Figure 3 depicts the prole of equilibria as a function of the fee a.16
0 a(N)
Only informalityMultiple equilibria: full
formality or  informality
Formality equilibrium
Informality equilibrium
Figure 3: Prole of equilibria
3.2 The rst best institutional fee
In the remainder of this Section, we characterize the optimum fee from the
viewpoint of a hypothetical central planner willing to maximize the total sum
of agentsutilities. The planner compares the maximum welfare attainable in
the scenario in which agents pay a fee to enjoy the benets of formal interac-
tions with the (xed) level of social welfare under complete informality.
In the case of full formality, the constrained maximization problem of
this planner can be written as:
max
a
W F (a) = N [(!   a)x(a) + (a  c)] + !
s:t: a  a(N):
Given our assumptions on x(); this objective function is concave. The
intuition behind this is that increasing a makes the institution more e¢ cient
but it also reduces the endowment available for interactions. The rst order
condition implicitly characterizes an interior solution a such that:
!   a = x(a
)  1
xa(a)
: (4)
16For the range of fees [0; a(N)] there also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
agents become formal with probability p(a) = 1 
a
! a . Although this can in principle
support an intermediate level of formality, the revenue raised by the institution in this
equilibrium is maximized at a = a(N) so p(a(N)) = 1. Hence, in this case full formality
would arise as well.
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The fee a cannot be higher than the maximum fee compatible with
full formality. Hence, the planner chooses to implement full formality with a
fee equal to
aF = minfa; a(N)g:
This implies that the solution to the planners problem will be a corner
solution, i.e. a  a(N), as long as    , where   satises:17
  =
x(!(1   ))  1
!xa(!(1   )) : (5)
As  increases, formal agents have stronger incentives to defect. A
lower fee a(N) is now necessary to support formality and the room for an
interior solution shrinks. On the other hand, the e¤ect of an increase in the
endowment ! is ambiguous: It relaxes the constraint but also changes the
objective function by making interactions more protable.
The planner can leave the economy in a state of full informality. In
that case, total welfare is just
W I = (N + 1)!x(0): (6)
There may exist values of the parameters for which the maximum wel-
fare under formality, i.e. W F (a(N))(aF ); is lower than under informality. This
is characterized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 There exists a threshold x on the payo¤ under autarky x(0)
such that social welfare under full formality is lower than under informality if
x(0) > x  1
N + 1
(
1

+N
 
!   aF  x(aF ) + aF   c
!
): (7)
Moreover, x is increasing in both the population size N and agents initial
endowment ! and decreasing in the status-quo level of trust  :
Hence, for small and relatively poor economies (lowN or !) full formal-
ity may not be the most desirable outcome. Similarly, when the problems of
miscoordination are not very severe (high ), the cost of setting an institution
may outweigh the gains.
17It is straightforward to show that such xed point exists.
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4 Emergence of the institution
Since no central coordination device exists before the members of a society
actually create one, any e¤ort to set up an institution that will enforce co-
operation has to proceed in a decentralized way. The basic idea is that the
center must be given incentives to act as such. In this Section, we analyze
this process and highlight how commitment problems a¤ect the e¢ ciency of
the emerging institution or block its emergence despite its potentially welfare
enhancing e¤ect.
We dene a procedure of institution formation as a fair lottery over the
set of agents who freely participate in it. This lottery designates the agent
who subsequently will be in charge of running the institution. The fee a can
be set either before the lottery takes place or afterwards.
A lottery is the simplest mechanism to choose the individual to be
in charge of the institution. It is so because all agents are alike and hence
there is no reason why a priori they should not be equally likely to end up
in charge of the institution. This is reminiscent of Rawls(1971) concept of
the original position. Moreover, a lottery also constitutes the reduced form
of more complex mechanisms, like for instance auctions or contests: If they
were used, the equilibrium would be typically symmetric and a winner should
therefore be randomly chosen.
In this general framework, di¤erent procedures of institution formation
are possible depending on the di¤erent degrees of commitment available both
at the individual and at the collective level, the natural benchmark being a
fully decentralized process with no commitment whatsoever.
Agents must decide simultaneously and ex-ante whether to participate
or not in the lottery that will designate who will run the institution. Hence,
given a level of the fee a; the institution can arise only if
1
N + 1
(N(a  c) + !) + N
N + 1
(!   a)x(a)  !x(a); (8)
where the left hand side shows the expected payo¤ from participating,
as the sum of the centers and the agentspayo¤s respectively weighted by
their corresponding probabilities, and the right hand side is the payo¤ from
unilateral deviation. In equilibrium, it is easy to show that either all or no
agent will participate in the process.
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outcome of the lottery. Therefore, when there is no commitment at the indi-
vidual level, an ex-post participation constraint needs to be imposed as well.
This requires that, once they discover their role, agents should not prefer to
fall back into informality. As this ex-post requirement is always satised for
an agent who does not become the center18, the centers ex-post participation
constraint is the only relevant one:
N(a  c) + !  !x(0): (9)
This denes a minimum level of the fee
a  !x(0)  1
N
+ c;
below which the agent chosen to be the center would prefer to give up
and the whole economy would collapse into informality.19
The benchmark assumption of no commitment implies that collective
choices are not possible and that the central agent has total freedom to set
the fee once she takes up her role. In that case, she will behave as a revenue
maximizing monopolist. However, we will also contemplate the possibility of
the fee a being chosen collectively and that this choice may be binding. In
this case, agents will set a fee that maximizes total welfare behind the veil
of ignorance, that is, before the outcome of the lottery is realized.20 Table 1
below summarizes the possible combinations of assumptions.
18It is obvious that (!  a)x(a)  !x(a) for any a not greater than the upper bound on
a, which is a(N) = !(1  ).
19Note that because all agents are alike and either all or none participate in the lottery
ex ante, we do not have to worry about the case of an agent not participating in the lottery
but willing to become formal ex post.
20Admittedly there may be other processes. The ones considered here are polar cases.
All the di¤erent processes of institution formation that we will discuss
next rely on this basic participation constraint. Still, agents who accept to
participate in the process may change their mind ex-post depending on the
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Lottery choice
is binding
No Yes
Center can
commit to a
fee a
No
1. Agents’ only
commit to participate
in the lottery ex ante.
The center may
renege ex post and is
free to set a.
2. Agents commit ex
ante to participate in
the lottery and cannot
renege ex post if
chosen as the center.
Yes
3. Agents commit ex
ante to participate in
the lottery. If chosen
as the center, they
may renege, but have
no freedom to set a.
4. Agents commit ex
ante to participate in
the lottery and not to
renege ex post. The
center has no freedom
to set a ex post.
Table 1.
Next we explore these di¤erent scenarios, starting with the natural
benchmark, the no commitmentcase.
4.1 No commitment
Under the no commitmentor fully decentralized procedure, the fee is freely
set by the central agent. Hence, in addition to the ex-ante participation con-
straint, the ex-post one must be imposed. We know from Section 3 that the
maximum fee that the institution can charge is a(N): Therefore, agents will
participate only if the two following conditions hold:
1
N + 1
(N(a(N)  c) + !) + N
N + 1
(!   a(N))x(a(N))  !x(a(N)); (10)
N(a(N)  c) + !  !x(0); (11)
which are simply the result of rewriting the ex ante lottery participation
constraint (8) and the ex post constraint of the center (9) by replacing a with
a(N): These two conditions are necessary for the institution to arise. Note
that when a = a(N), trading agents are indi¤erent between formality and
informality. Therefore, (10) can be rewritten as:
N(a(N)  c) + !  !x(a(N)); (12)
from which it is evident that (10) is a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for (11) to be satised. If it does not hold, the economy will remain in a state
of informality.21
21Of course, this is only true for a = a(N) and does not need to be veried for lower
values of the fee.
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Finally, we need to establish which fee will be set by the institution in
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 If condition (12) holds, there exists a SPE of the fully decen-
tralized procedure of institution formation that implements full formality under
the fee a(N).
There are two possible sources of ine¢ ciency in this scenario. On the
one hand, full formality is not implemented when (12) does not hold, despite
the fact that it may still be e¢ ciency enhancing. This is the case when para-
meters are such that the level of individual welfare (assuming equal weights)
obtained under formality
W F (a(N))(a(N)) =
1
N + 1
(N(a(N)  c) + !) + N
N + 1
(!   a(N))x(a(N));
dominates the level of welfare under full informality but is not high
enough to induce ex ante participation in the lottery.
Corollary 1 (Non-emergence of e¢ cient institutions) Under the fully
decentralized procedure, a potentially welfare enhancing institution does not
arise if and only if the level of individual welfare under formality W F (a(N))
is such that
!x(0)  W F (a(N))(a(N))  !x(a(N)): (13)
This ine¢ ciency occurs in economies of intermediate size and when the status-
quo level of trust  is su¢ ciently high.
The proof can be found in the appendix. The lower bound in (13)
determines when formality is more e¢ cient than informality, whereas the upper
bound establishes when formality is implementable. Between these bounds,
the institution is welfare enhancing but it does not emerge.
In line with Dixit (2003b and 2004) and Greif (2006), Corollary 1 shows
that the rst type of ine¢ ciency is more likely to occur in economies of in-
termediate size and with limited coordination problems (high ). In the rst
place, it occurs if the size of the population is not small enough for informality
to be superior, but not big enough for the institution to arise. The reason
why N has to be large enough for the institution to arise comes from the fact
that the centers expected revenue is increasing in N , so there is a minimum
population size above which the prospect of becoming the center gives agents
enough incentive to participate in the lottery. As in Bates et al. (2002), the
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agent endowed with the institutional role reneges if she is not able to extract
enough resources.
On the other hand, the range of parameters for which a welfare enhanc-
ing institution does not arise expands as  increases. High trust makes the
outside option of informality more attractive and undermines the dominant
position of the revenue-maximizing institution. We should then observe the
emergence of formal institutions in societies plagued with coordination prob-
lems and low levels of informal trust, while informal exchanges are more likely
to prevail in societies with relatively high level of trust. When ine¢ ciencies
are not too severe, bearing the cost involved in solving them is not incentive
compatible at the individual level, despite being socially e¢ cient. In conclu-
sion, even if the central agent is able to maximize revenue when setting a; the
emergence of a desirable institution is not ensured.
This corollary would need some qualication if we relaxed two assump-
tions: First, if the central agent does not specialize completely in the institu-
tional task and retains some ability to interact, her incentives to act as such
would increase, hence reducing the range of ine¢ ciency. Still, as long as she
cannot enjoy the full benet from interacting with others, ine¢ ciency will per-
sist. On the other hand, if the payo¤ of informal agents does not depend on
the e¢ ciency of the institution, ine¢ ciency vanishes. But as soon as we have
some degree of free-riding the result holds again.
Even if full formality is implemented, the fee set by the central agent
may be too high and the rst best may not be attained. A necessary condition
for this second type of ine¢ ciency to occur is a low enough degree of trust in
bilateral interactions, i.e.  <  , that implies aF = a < a(N).
Corollary 2 (Implementable rst best) When condition (12) holds, the
rst best fee aF can be implemented in a SPE of the fully decentralized pro-
cedure of institution formation for high enough levels of status quo-trust, i.e.
   :
The intuition for this result is easy to grasp. When welfare is increasing
over the range of fees compatible with formality or, in other words, when the
level of status-quo trust  is su¢ ciently high, the planner would like to set the
highest fee possible (i.e., aF = a(N)). In that case, the centers incentives are
aligned with social welfare and the rst best can be attained by means of the
decentralized procedure. Otherwise, the resulting fee will be excessive from
the social point of view.
In conjunction, these two corollaries imply that di¤erent societies are
characterized by di¤erent ine¢ ciencies. Institutions are more likely to emerge
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in societies with low levels of trust, but if they do, they will tend to be too
extractive relative to the socially optimal outcome, as in Gambettas (1993)
account of the Sicilian maa.22 On the other hand, societies with higher levels
of trust may nd it di¢ cult to generate formal coordinating institutions, but
if they succeed, these are more likely to be e¢ cient.
4.2 Partial commitment
While the no commitment case appears to be the natural benchmark of our
economy, it is useful to consider how the outcome of the procedure of insti-
tution formation varies when some degree of commitment is introduced along
each of the two dimensions considered above: Individual commitment and a
binding collective choice of the fee. Of course, that raises the question of
how such a commitment is secured and enforced. We have some sort of a
chicken-and-egg problem here: We started in an institutionless world, where
there was a basic problem of enforcing coordination in bilateral relations. The
possibility of commitment in the present case would however indicate the ex-
istence of perhaps a mechanism capable of enforcing it. After showing briey
how commitment may improve e¢ ciency in the institution formation process
under each of the possible combinations of assumptions considered in Table 1
above, we discuss how it may be enforced: In Section 5, we analyze in more de-
tail two mechanisms that may endogenously support some degree of collective
commitment despite full decentralization.
As mentioned, introducing commitment at the individual level amounts
to assume that agents do not renege ex post, whatever the outcome of the lot-
tery. Therefore, only agentsex-ante participation constraint (8) needs to be
satised (Case 2). On the other hand, at the collective level, commitment
arises if the fee a is xed by all participating agents before the actual running
of the lottery and this choice is binding (Case 3). Finally, combining the two
yields the possibility of full commitment (Case 4).
Case 2. First, assume that agents are able to commit to set up the institution
if chosen to run it, so the ex-post participation constraint (11) is dropped, but
22He also introduces the twist that the institution may actually inject distrust to increase
its own prot.
the center retains total freedom to set the fee. Therefore, only condition (10)
must hold. Since we know from Case 1 that condition (10) is stronger than
(11), it is obvious that this does not introduce any change with respect to
the benchmark no-commitment case. This shows that a stronger individual
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commitment is only useful if accompanied by some degree of collective com-
mitment on the choice of the fee (see Case 4 below).
Case 3. Consider now the case in which a binding choice of the fee a is made
by agents in advance to the lottery, but they cannot commit ex-ante not to
renege ex-post in case they are chosen to run the institution. Then, society will
choose a fee that maximizes social welfare subject to the ex post participation
constraint, that is, a fee high enough to compensate the central agent. Hence
it must be at least greater than a. Still, the fee chosen has to be compati-
ble with full formality (hence not above a(N)). Once this holds, society will
implement a fee as close as possible to the rst best.
Proposition 5 The collective choice of the fee implements full formality if
and only if the minimum fee that satises the ex-post participation constraint
is smaller than the maximum fee compatible with formality, i.e. a  a(N). In
that case, the fee set is a = maxfa; aFg and the rst best is achieved if and
only if a  aF .
First, it is important to note that the collective choice of the fee makes
the implementation of the institution no easier than under the fully decentral-
ized procedure, as it still requires a  a(N). However, this type of commitment
makes the institution more e¢ cient when implemented, because the rst best
is now more likely to be attained. On the other hand, even if that cannot be
the case, i.e. a(N) > a  a; there is an improvement with respect to the
same case under the fully decentralized procedure, since the fee chosen is a
instead of a(N), and thus closer to the social optimum:
Case 4. Finally, consider the case where there is no ex-post participation
constraint (strong individual commitment) and agents agree that they should
implement the rst best.23 It is easy to see that then the e¢ cient outcome is
always implemented.
Proposition 6 When both individual and collective commitment are possible,
full formality is implemented if and only if informality does not maximize
welfare, i.e. x(0)  x: Moreover, the rst-best is always attained.
23While in the no commitment case discussed in the previous section the ex-post partic-
ipation constraint was irrelevant as it was implied by the ex ante one, this may of course
not be the case when a < a(N).
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The intuition is straightforward: When x(0)  x; the rst best fee
aF is high enough to ensure that the ex-ante participation constraint (8) is
satised. Therefore, individual incentives do not stand in the way of e¢ ciency
in this case and formality is implemented whenever it is e¢ cient. This result
is similar to the one in Acemoglu (2003), where full commitment of the ruler
and citizens ensures that a political Coase theorem holds.
To summarize, when considering the decentralized institution formation
process, the inability to constrain the center to chose a specic level of fee (lack
of collective commitment) is a strong reason for the occurrence of ine¢ ciencies,
and one that cannot be alleviated by introducing individual commitment (Case
2). As this limit is relaxed, potential ine¢ ciencies are reduced, as shown by
Case 3. Finally, when the ability to set fees ex-ante is combined with individual
commitment (Case 4), the rst best is always implementable.
The next Section discusses two decentralized mechanisms that can en-
force some degree of commitment: The use of threshold strategies in the bench-
mark version of our game and the possibility of coalitional secession.
5 Endogenous commitment
Threshold strategies
In the discussion above, we left aside the full informality equilibrium. Recall
from Proposition 2 that full informality can arise in equilibrium of any fee in
the interval [0; a(N)]: Agents can use this multiplicity of equilibria to tame
the central agent and make him reduce the fee. To show this consider the
following threshold strategy to be used by agents in our one-shot game:
F =

1 if a  a0
0 otherwise,
(14)
where a0  a(N): These strategies constitute an equilibrium of the
subgame that starts after the central agents announces the fee. Then, if all
agents use them to decide whether to become formal or not, the central agents
best response under no commitment is to choose a0: This threat enlarges the
set of possible fees that can be supported in equilibrium and opens the door to
a welfare improvement. Still, the ex-post constraint must holds, so this prole
can only implement fees greater than a, the minimum fee that satises the
ex-post participation constraint.
Proposition 7 If condition (8) holds for a  a; there exists a SPE of the
fully decentralized procedure that implements the rst-best fee:
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Notice that the use of this type of strategies leads to a scenario very
similar to the one in Case 3 because they act as a collective commitment device
capable of enforcing a specic level of the fee, i.e. the threshold a0;that may be
closer to the rst-best fee. For that threshold to be implemented it must be be
compatible with the center acting as such, i.e. a0  a; and it must ensure that
agents want to participate in the process, i.e. it must satisfy condition (8).
Moreover, even if the rst best cannot be attained (because a(N) > a  a);
threshold strategies can help to reduce the ine¢ ciency associated with a too
extractive central agent. However, it is not clear how in a state of nature that
we dene as completely noncooperative, agents can coordinate in the use of
these strategies, which seem to involve some degree of multilateral agreement.
Secession
Let us now consider the possibility that a coalition of agents secedes from
society to run their own institution. Since our starting point is a state of
nature where no commitment is possible, the concept of secession-proofness
has a clear importance. An institution can hardly be called self-enforcing if a
subgroup of agents can improve its situation by withdrawing from it.
Specically, our analysis of secession will concentrate on the secession-
proofness of the decentralized procedure of institution formation, assuming
that it will be employed both by the whole population and any subgroup
intending to withdraw. Then, we analyze when the threat of secession can
prevent the emergence of a single institution and its e¤ect on e¢ ciency.
Let us rst state our denition of blocking:
Denition 1 Denote by aN the fee set by the institution. A coalition formed
by S interacting agents is a blocking coalition if and only if
(!   aN)x(aN) < 1
S
(S(a(N)  c) + !) + S   1
S
(!   a(N))x(a(N)): (15)
Our concept of blocking implies that no group of agents should prefer
(in expectation) to withdraw from society and apply among them the fully
decentralized procedure of institution formation. This is a relatively strong
requirement.24 Note that when a coalition contemplates the possibility of
secession, it recognizes that the fee that will be set in the hypothetical new
24Alternatively, we could have imposed a weaker criterion, as in Howe and Roemer (1981),
in which a coalition is blocking whenever it can guarantee a higher payo¤ to its members
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equilibrium fee we have at length considered in the previous sections.25
Denition 2 A fee aN is said to be secession-proof if it does not spawn any
blocking coalition.
Secession-proof fees are natural focal points in the process of institution
formation: They are said to be in the core of that particular procedure of
institution formation.26
Given that we are analyzing the case of no commitment, we assume that
the central agent will set the maximum possible secession-proof fee. Secession
thus imposes new and natural constraints on the fee that the institutional
agent can charge. Notice that, if full formality is not implementable when
secession is not an option, this will continue to be the case when secession is
possible; since the revenue of the central agent cannot increase, secession thus
cannot help potentially welfare enhancing institutions to emerge.
The rst question that arises is whether the set of secession-proof fees
is empty or not. It is easy to check that the payo¤of a coalition contemplating
the possibility of withdrawing is increasing in its size S: Therefore, for a fee to
be secession-proof it is enough to satisfy condition (15) for S = N:
On the other hand, the fee that maximizes agentswelfare solves
max
a
N (!   a)x(a)
s:t: a  a(N):
The above program yields an interior solution a characterized by the
rst order condition
!   a = x(a
)
xa(a)
: (16)
Therefore it is clear that a < a. Again, there exist a threshold
  such that the solution to this problem is interior whenever    : It is
straightforward as well to show that   <  : Hence, the level of the fee that
maximizes the welfare of the set of interacting agents is either a or a(N):
Let us assume, for the sake of exposition, that minfa; a(N)g > a:
25Note that for all S, a(N) = a(S) = !(1   ), so we stick to the current notation for
simplicity.
26As any core-related concept, our denition of blocking only takes into account one-step
secessions. We do not consider the possibility of further blocking once a new society is
formed. The set of secession-proof fees dened here is thus minimal in this sense.
institution must be itself self-enforcing. We have in this case picked a(N) the
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The set of secession-proof fees is thus non-empty if and only if
1
N
((N   1)(a(N)  c) + !) + N   1
N
!x(a(N)) (17)
 (!  minfa; a(N)g)x(minfa; a(N)g):
The left hand side of this expression is the expected benet from form-
ing a coalition of N agents and seceding from the institution. The right hand
side is the benet from staying under the current institution when the central
agent sets the fee that maximizing the payo¤ of the rest of agent. Thus, if
this condition is not met, a single institution cannot be stable and we should
expect multiple ones to emerge. The next proposition summarizes the condi-
tions, in terms of the population size N and the level of status-quo trust  ;
under which secession may occur.
Proposition 8 The set of secession-proof fees is non-empty if and only if N
is below a certain threshold eN: Furthermore, eN attains a minimum at  =
 (<  ):
The main reason for blocking in this model is thus the prospect of
becoming the center in the new mini society. When the size of the population
is su¢ ciently big, the center obtains an extremely high payo¤ and this creates
strong incentives to withdraw. As a matter of fact a(N) stops being secession-
proof when condition
(N   1)(a(N)  c) + ! > !x(a(N));
holds, implying that the central agent of the new institution can obtain
a higher payo¤ than the rest of agents.
Figure 4 depicts the regions characterized by these thresholds in the
parameter space.
When the level of status-quo trust is su¢ ciently small (i.e.  <  ) and
the population size is intermediate, it may still be possible for the institution to
avoid secession by charging a fee below a(N). In that case, secession can help to
alleviate the ine¢ ciency produced by a too high fee compared to the case where
secession is not possible. But outside this region of parameters, secession is a
real threat that renders impossible the emergence of one institution comprising
all agents in society.
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SP empty
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empty
Figure 4: The set of secession-proof fees.
The natural question that now arises is whether the impossibility of
a single institution matters from an e¢ ciency perspective. The answer of
course depends on the particular rules of secession and coalition formation to
be considered. Here we will assume that whatever this process is, any division
of the population into several smaller societies is stable only if all groups can
set a secession-proof fee.
Formally, a coalition structure is a division of the population into a
collection C = fC1; :::; CKg of disjoint coalitions of generic size Sk  3: It is
straightforward to extend our previous denition of secession-proof fees to the
case of subgroups: We will say that a coalition structure C is secession-proof if
all coalitions in it set a (possibly di¤erent) fee that does not spawn a blocking
coalition within them. Here, we will concentrate on the case of     for
simplicity, meaning that in any secession-proof coalition structure all groups
will set a(N) since it is the unique secession-proof fee.
Next we show that if one considers secession-proof coalition structures
as the natural outcome of any process of coalition formation (or secession),
the impossibility of a single institution is negative from a social point of view.
Proposition 9 When    ,the total sum of payo¤s under the single insti-
tution is at least as big as under any secession-proof coalition structure.
Asmentioned before, the incentives to secede come from agentsprospect
of becoming the center of the new mini-society. Recall that when the fee is
a(N), it is only the central agent who extracts positive rents. However, this
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is socially wasteful because it leads to an unnecessary proliferation of institu-
tions. Obviously, this conclusion makes abstraction from the possibility that
the coordination job of the center in smaller groups may entail lower transac-
tion costs, i.e. lower c in our model. If that is the case, a trade-o¤ arises and
the above conclusion may require qualication.
6 Discussion and conclusion
The contribution of this paper is to focus on the process through which in-
stitutions aimed at enforcing cooperation may actually emerge when such co-
ordination device did not previously exist. More specically, our aim is to
determine whether these mechanisms arise whenever they are potentially wel-
fare enhancing, and whether they are as e¢ cient as they could possibly be
when they do arise.
We have built a model in which economic interactions take the form of
a modied prisoners dilemma game. In a hypothetical state of nature, agents
are randomly matched to play this game without any interference and hence
some degree of ine¢ ciency ensues. We have assumed that agents can delegate
the task of enforcing cooperation to one of them (the institution) in exchange
for a proper compensation. Examples of this type of mechanisms can be found
in Economics, Sociology and Law.
In a world of no commitment, the main motivation to participate in
the process of institution formation is the potential rent associated with being
a revenue maximizing center. In this context, the model yields clear answers
to both questions above. First, there exists a region in the parameters space
in which a potentially welfare enhancing institution does not arise. This is be-
cause individual and social incentives are not aligned and each individual fails
to internalize the cost that he imposes on others by opting out of the potential
institutional arrangement. Such an ine¢ ciency is more likely for societies of
intermediate size, an insight reminiscent of Dixits (2003b) intermediate-size
worlds fare worstresult. Groups that are too small are optimally left to the
informal type of interaction. Although this is not made explicit in our model,
an additional intuitive reason for this may be that N and the payo¤ from
informal interactions y (and therefore the endogenous measure of trust ) are
inversely related. On the other hand, as the number of individuals grows, the
rent associated with being in charge of running the coordinating institution
becomes large enough to ensure that it will emerge.
Moreover, a welfare enhancing institution may fail to arise if the gap
between the payo¤ from non cooperation and cooperation is not very large,
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that is, if what we called trust in the state of nature is high enough. Because
the outside option is not very bad, agents are more reluctant to engage in
the costly process of institution creation. This intuitive negative correlation
between the likelihood of the emergence of formal institutions and the level of
trust sheds light on one of the fundamental identication problems that arise
in the empirical literature on social capital (see Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2006).
Indeed, it seems to be the case that when formal institutions are weak, social
capital (understood for example as trust in our model) substitutes for them.
When formal institutions grow stronger, a process that occurs along the path
of development, some form of social capital may be destroyed or become less
important (see Routledge and von Amsberg, 2003, for theoretical examples
of such e¤ects). We may therefore observe a negative correlation between
measures of trust and social or economic outcomes, but rather than reecting
some causal link, it is the result of a fundamental endogenous link between
social capital and formal institutions of the type described in our model.
Second, our model makes a step towards understanding the observed
heterogeneity of institutions. Indeed, even when the institution emerges, it
may do so at various levels of e¢ ciency, and in particular it may be suboptimal,
in the sense that it will charge a fee that is above the welfare maximizing
level. This is due to the absence of a collective commitment device to set the
institutional fee in advance, which allows the chosen center to adopt a revenue
maximizing strategy.
However, contrary to the previous one, this type of ine¢ ciency is more
likely to happen for low levels of trust, i.e. when the gap between non co-
operative and cooperative payo¤s is large. So di¤erent societies face di¤erent
potential problems. When trust is low, a welfare enhancing institution is likely
to arise but will probably be too extractive in nature. In a sense, this is the
price to pay for coordination to be enforced in a context in which the loss
from non-cooperation is large. On the other hand, when trust is high, an in-
stitution may not arise, but if it does, it is more likely to be e¢ cient. Indeed,
because the gains from formal coordination are relatively low in that case, an
institution that would be too extractive is unlikely to be individually incentive
compatible in the rst place.
We then show that the two types of ine¢ ciencies stem from the lack of
individual and collective commitment. However, there is a fundamental asym-
metry here, in the sense that individual commitment to run the institution
would not change the results above unless it is accompanied by collective com-
mitment on the fee that will be charged ex post. On the other hand, collective
commitment goes some way towards solving excessive rent extraction and, if
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accompanied by individual commitment, it does restore the rst best in the
sense that a political Coase theorem can hold (Acemoglu, 2003).
The question of course is how commitment may arise endogenously in
a world in which no coordination device or authority exist ex-ante. We show
that the threat of secession by subgroups of agents may generate such collective
commitment, at least when the level of trust is low enough and the number
of agents not too large. On the other hand, as this number becomes large
enough, secession becomes unavoidable, resulting in a multi-institution world.
This is for example the case in the work of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)
where they show that increasing demands from the ruler may trigger defection
from a subset of agents, as in the case of Vichy France.
In the basic version of our model, secession always reduces welfare com-
pared to a unique central institution. However, transaction cost considerations
may introduce a trade-o¤ here, if for example coordination in smaller groups
is characterized by lower such costs. Endogenizing these transaction costs is
an interesting area for future research and would make it possible to better
understand situations characterized by multiple institutional spheres.
The issue of collective commitment to limit the level of fee extraction
opens to the broader question of how a constitution can place checks on abuses
by the ruler in more complex settings. While this is beyond the scope of this
paper, the work of Roger Myerson is relevant here, especially the idea that
agents under this rule must be rewarded to ensure stability of power (e.g.,
Myerson, 2006a and 2006b). Although we do not explicitly model the agency
issues considered there, Myersons point in terms of the ruler having to commit
to large enough future rewards resembles our result on the threat of secession
putting limits to the rulers extractive power.
Some further remarks regarding our assumptions are in order. One
possible modication of our model is to relax the anonymity of the matching
technology. If formal agents could verify the identity of their partner right
after being matched nothing would change. The payo¤ from interacting with
an informal agent is by assumption always greater than the autarchic payo¤,
so it never pays o¤ to walk away from a match. On the other hand, one
could assume that formal agents have a probability of matching with other
formal agents higher than the one implied by the anonymous random matching
process. That would increase the value of formality and hence the fee that the
center can charge. However, apart from the non-generic case in which formal
agents are matched to each other with probability one, the conguration of
equilibria would not change.
A repeated version of the game in which the central agent stays in the
role once chosen would not improve upon the one-shot version. In this context,
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agentstrigger strategies would be identical to the threshold strategies we have
already discussed in Section 5. Moreover, the central agent could charge fees
above a(N) by threatening not to perform his task. Things would be di¤erent
though if the central agent could be replaced. In this case, the parameter set
in which an e¢ cient institution arises is likely to expand. This is an open
question that we leave for further research.
Finally, we have assumed identical agents because we were mainly in-
terested in the factors that may hinder or foster the emergence of institutions.
It is clear, however, that individual heterogeneity represents an interesting av-
enue for further research and in the future we intend to explore the impact
of endowment inequality on the results of the present paper. This may have
interesting implications, in particular in the eld of development economics.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Since a(K) is increasing in K, only corner cong-
urations can prevail, i.e. no intermediate number of formal agents 0 < K < N
can be supported as an equilibrium of this stage game. Suppose that a  a(K)
so no formal agents wants to deviate. Then, since we also have a < a(K + 1),
informal agents would deviate and become formal, leading to full formality.
Similarly, if a  a(K + 1), which is the necessary condition to sustain N  K
informal agents, formal agents would have an incentive to defect to informality,
leading to an equilibrium with only informal agents.
Proof of Proposition 3. The condition (7) comes from just comparing the
welfare under full formality with expression (6). Taking the derivative of the
right hand side with respect to N yields
@x
@N
=
1
(N + 1)2
 
!   aF  x(aF ) + aF   c
!
  1

!
;
where we make use of the fact that, regardless of whether the solution is interior
or not, aF does not depend on N . It can be shown that @x
@N
> 0. Similarly,
@x
@!
=
N
N + 1
aF (x(aF )  1) + c
!2
+
N
N + 1
1
!
@aF
@!
( x(aF ) +  !   aF  xa(aF ) + 1):
Note rst that the expression in brackets in the second term is the FOC
of the planners problem and hence it is nonnegative. Second, if aF = a(N);
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@aF
@!
= 1    > 0 and then it is clear that the lower bound x is increasing in
!. On the other hand, when aF = a the bracketed term is equal to zero since
the FOC of the planners problem is binding. Finally,
@x
@
=
1
N + 1
(  1
 2
 N
 
!   aF  x(aF ) + aF   c
 2!
+
N
N + 1
1
!
@aF
@
( x(aF ) +  !   aF  xa(aF ) + 1):
Again, when aF = a(N) then @a
F
@
=  ! > 0 and x is decreasing in  ,
and when aF = a the second term is equal to zero.
Proof of Corollary 1. The comparative statics on N can be derived by
noting that W F (a(N)) is increasing in N , while the upper and lower lim-
its do not depend on N (since a(N) = !(1   )). Rewriting W F (a(N)) =
N
N+1
[a(N)  c) + (!   a(N))x(a(N))]+ !
N+1
; the derivative with respect to N
is given by
@W F (a(N))
@N
=
! (x (a (N))  )  c
(N + 1)2
;
which is positive since by assumption !(1  ) > c and x (a (N)) > 1.
On the other hand, the e¤ects of the level of status-quo trust  can be
estimated in the following way. Di¤erentiating
W F (a(N)) =
N
N + 1
[!   c+ ! [x(!(1  ))  1]] + !
N + 1
;
with respect to  , we get that
@W F (a(N))
@
=
N
N + 1
! [x (!(1  ))  1  !x0 (!(1  ))] ;
while the derivative of the upper bound is given by:
@ [!x(a(N))]
@
= ! [x (!(1  ))  !x0 (!(1  ))] :
Since @[!x(a(N))]
@
> @W
F (a(N))
@
, and W F (a(N)) > !x(a(N)) for  close
to 0 (the right hand side then tends to 0), we deduce that there is a threshold
value  such that formality is only implemented through the decentralized
procedure if  < . Note that depending on the value of the parameters, it
might be the case that  > 1, so no ine¢ ciency arises.
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Proof of Proposition 8. When a(N) > a; expression (17) implicitly
denes a threshold on the population size denoted by N0( ; !) such that a
is secession-proof whenever N  N0( ; !): Similarly, when a(N) < a the
threshold
N1( ; !)  !x(a(N))  !
a(N)  c + 1;
can be dened as the maximum population size that is compatible with a(N)
being secession-proof. Hence, denote by
eN   N0( ; !) if    
N1( ; !) otherwise
:
Now recall from our discussion in Section 3 that there exists a value of
the status quo trust denoted by   such that a  a(N) whenever    :
In that case, minfa; a(N)g = a and the threshold N0( ; !) applies. By the
Implicit Function Theorem,
@N0( ; !)
@
= N(N   1)!1  x(a(N)) + !xa(a(N))
(!x(a(N))  !   c) :
Note that the denominator is the FOC of the utilitarian planner prob-
lem. We know that when  <   then a(N) < a; and the numerator is
negative (positive otherwise).
Similarly, for  >  ; N1( ; !) becomes the relevant threshold and
@N1( ; !)
@
= !
x(a(N))(!   c)  !xa(a(N))(a(N)  c)  !
(a(N)  c)2 :
Since in this case, a(N) < a; then x(a(N)) > !xa(a(N)) so the
denominator has a positive sign. Note as well, that this derivative evaluated
at  = 0 is positive, and that the denominator is decreasing in  : Hence,
N1( ; !) is everywhere increasing in  :
Proof of Proposition 9. When C is secession-proof the total sum of payo¤s
is simply
W FC =
KX
k=1
[(Sk   1)(a(N)  c) + ! + (Sk   1)!x(a(N))]
= (N + 1 K)(a(N)  c+ !x(a(N))) +K!:
This expression is clearly decreasing in K; the number of coalitions
in C: Therefore, the total sum of payo¤s under any secession-proof coalition
structure can never be greater than under the single institution (they are equal
if the single institution is secession-proof itself).
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